We provide a model that bridges de gap between the simplest variation of two benchmark models of strategic network formation: Bala and Goyal's oneway ‡ow model without decay, where links can be unilaterally formed, and a variation without decay of Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model based on bilateral formation of links. In the model introduced here, a link can be created unilaterally, but when it is only supported by one player the ‡ow through the link only occurs towards the player supporting it and su¤ers some degree of decay, while when it is supported by both the ‡ow runs without friction in both directions. When the decay in links supported by only one player is maximal (i.e. there is no ‡ow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay, while when ‡ow in those links is perfect towards the player supporting them, we have Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model. We study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stability for the intermediate models. E¢ ciency and dynamics are also discussed.
Introduction
In the economic literature there are two basic models of strategic network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , where the formation of a link between two players requires the agreement of both, and Bala and Goyal (2000) , where a link can be formed unilaterally by any player. The …rst model presents two variants, the connections model and the coauthor model. Bala and Goyal's model also has two variants: the one-way ‡ow model, where the ‡ow through a link runs towards a player only if he/she supports it, and the two-way ‡ow model, where ‡ow runs in both directions irrespective of which player supports the link. Each of these models have been extended in di¤erent directions 1 . In two previous papers we study some transitional models. In Olaizola and Valenciano (2014a) we provide a model that integrates Bala and Goyal's one-way and two-way ‡ow models as particular extreme cases of a more general model of network formation that we call "asymmetric ‡ow" model, and characterize Nash and strict Nash structures for the whole range of intermediate models. In Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b) we take this uni…cation a step further. More precisely, we provide a new hybrid model which has Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay and Bala and Goyal's two-way ‡ow model as extreme cases.
In this paper, in order to make the transition between Jackson and Wolinsky's model without decay and Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model we introduce heterogeneity relative to link reliability or decay 2 . In the model introduced and studied here, a link can be created unilaterally, but when it is only supported by one of the two players that it connects (such a link is referred to as a "weak"link) the ‡ow through the link runs only towards the player that supports it and su¤ers some degree of decay, but when a link is supported by both players (referred to as a "strong"link) the ‡ow runs without friction in both directions. When the decay in weak links is maximal (i.e. there is no ‡ow) we have Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay, while when ‡ow towards the player that supports a weak link is perfect we have Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model. This provides in fact an interesting extension of both models and allows for a study of the "transition" from one model to the other. We study Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stability for the intermediate models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 notation and terminology relative to graphs is introduced. Section 3 reviews the connections model of network formation of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal's (2000) one-way ‡ow model. In Section 4, a model that bridges the gap between these two is presented and Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stable structures are studied for the intermediate models in Section 5. Section 6 addresses the question of e¢ ciency. Section 7 is devoted to dynamics. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the main conclusions and points out some lines of further research.
Graphs
A directed N -graph is a pair (N; ), where N = f1; 2; :::; ng is a …nite set with n 3 whose elements are called nodes, and is a subset of N N , whose elements (i; j) 2 are called links. When both (i; j) and (j; i) are in , we say that i and j are connected by a strong link, if only one of them exists we say that they are connected by a weak link. If M N , then j M denotes the M -graph (M; j M ) with
which we refer to as the M -subgraph of .
Alternatively, a graph can be speci…ed by a map g : N N ! f0; 1g,
When we specify a graph in this way by a map g, we denote g ij := g(i; j), and if g ij = 1 link (i; j) is referred to as "link ij in g", and we write ij 2 g. Note that for M N , subgraph j M is speci…ed by g j M M , but abusing notation such subgraph is referred to by g j M . The empty graph is denoted by g e (i.e. g e (i; j) = 0, for all i; j). If g ij = 1 in a graph g, g ij denotes the graph that results from replacing g ij = 1 by g ij = 0 in g; and if g ij = 0, g + ij denotes the graph that results from replacing g ij = 0 by g ij = 1. Similarly, if g ij = g ji = 1, g ij = (g ij) ji, and if g ij = g ji = 0, g + ij = (g + ij) + ji. An isolated node in a graph g is a node that is not involved in any link, that is, a node i s.t. for all j 6 = i, g ij = g ji = 0. A node is peripheral in a graph g if it is involved in a single link (weak or strong).
Given a graph g, a path of length k from j to i in g is a sequence of k + 1 distinct nodes j 0 ; j 1 ; :::; j k , s.t. j = j 0 , i = j k , and for all l = 1; :::; k, g j l 1 j l = 1 or g j l j l 1 = 1. If for all l = 1; :::; k, g j l j l 1 = 1, we say that the path is i-oriented. We say that a graph g is acyclic or contains no cycles if there is not a sequence of k (k > 2) distinct nodes, i 1 ; :::; i k , s.t. for all l = 1; :::; k 1, g j l j l+1 = 1 or g j l+1 j l = 1, and g 1k = 1 or g k1 = 1.
De…nition 1 Given a graph g, and C N , the subgraph g j C is said to be: (i) A component of g if for any two nodes i; j 2 C (i 6 = j), there is an i-oriented path from j to i in g, and no subset of N strictly containing C meets this condition.
(ii) A strong component of g if for any two nodes i; j 2 C (i 6 = j), there is a path of strong links from j to i in g, and no subset of N strictly containing C meets this condition.
When a component in either sense consists of a single node we say that it is a trivial component. In both senses, an isolated node, i.e. a node that is not involved in any link, is a trivial component. The size of a component is the number of nodes that forms it. C i (g) denotes the strong component of g that contains i. A strong component is isolated if none of its nodes is involved in a link with any node of another strong component.
Based on these de…nitions we have two di¤erent notions of connectedness. We say that a graph g is connected (strongly connected 3 ) if g is the unique component (strong component) of g. Note that strong connectedness implies connectedness.
A component (strong component) g j C of a graph g is minimal if for all i; j 2 C s.t. g ij = 1, the number of components (strong components) of g is smaller than the number of components (strong components) of g ij.
A graph is minimally connected (strongly connected) if it is connected (strongly connected) and minimal. A minimally strongly connected graph is a tree of strong links where any node in such tree can be seen as the root, i.e. a reference node from which there is a unique path connecting it with any other. An oriented wheel is a graph g s.t. for a certain permutation of N , i 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i n , we have g i k i k+l = 1 (k = 1; :::; n 1), and g n1 = 1, and no other links exist.
Given a graph g, the following notation is also used:
e. set of nodes with which i supports a link), N e (i; g) := fj 2 N : g ji = 1g (i.e. set of nodes which support a link with i),
set of nodes involved in a link with i):
The set of nodes connected with i by a path is denoted by N (i; g). The set of nodes connected with i by a path of strong links is denoted by N (i; g). The set of nodes connected with i by an i-oriented path is denoted byÑ (i; g). Their cardinalities are denoted by
We consider two measures of distance between nodes in a graph g based on two di¤erent notions of the length of a path. When there is no path connecting two nodes the distance between them in any of the senses is said to be 1. Otherwise, the distance between two nodes i; j (i 6 = j), denoted d(i; j; g), is the length of the shortest path connecting them. Note that the distance from i to j is the same as from j to i. In Section 4 we consider a situation where the ‡ow through a weak link occurs only towards the node that supports it, and with some friction or decay, in contrast with strong links, through which ‡ow is without friction in both directions. This motivates the following notion. The discounting oriented length of a path from j to i in g is: 1 if it is not an i-oriented path (i.e. the path contains a weak link not supported by the player closer to i); otherwise, if the path is i-oriented, its discounting oriented length is the length of the path minus the number of strong links in that path, that is, the number of oriented weak links in it. The discounting oriented distance from j to i (i 6 = j) in g, denoted~ (i; j; g), is de…ned as the discounting oriented length of the path from j to i with the shortest discounting oriented length. Note that this distance is not symmetric. Example 1: Consider the 6-node graph g consisting of the following path:
3; g) =~ (3; 2; g) = 0, d(4; 6; g) = d(6; 4; g) = 2;~ (4; 6; g) = 2;~ (6; 4; g) = 1.
3 Two strategic models of network formation
We consider situations where individuals may initiate or support links with other individuals under certain assumptions, thus creating a network formalized as a graph.
We assume that at each node i 2 N there is an agent identi…ed by label i and referred to as player 5 i. Each player i may initiate or, more generally, intend to initiate links with other players as depending on the assumptions an intended link may actually form or not 6 . A map g i : N nfig ! f0; 1g describes the links intended by i. We denote g ij := g i (j); and g ij = 1 (g ij = 0) means that i intends (does not intend) a link with j. Thus, vector g i = (g ij ) j2N nfig 2 f0; 1g N nfig speci…es the links intended by i and is referred to as a strategy of player i. G i := f0; 1g N nfig denotes the set of i's strategies and G N = G 1 G 2 ::: G n the set of strategy pro…les. A strategy pro…le g 2 G N univocally determines a graph (N; g ) of intended links, where g := f(i; j) 2 N N : g ij = 1g. Given a strategy pro…le g 2 G N and i 2 N , g i denotes the N nfig strategy pro…le that results by eliminating g i in g, i.e. all links intended by i, and (g i ; g 0 i ), where g 0 i 2 G i , denotes the strategy pro…le that results by replacing g i by g 0 i in g. Let g be a strategy pro…le representing players' intended links. We denote by g the associated graph representing the actual network that results from g. We consider several models under di¤erent assumptions, but the following are generally assumed:
1. Whether it actually forms or not, an intended link of player i with player j means a cost c ij > 0 for all j 6 = i.
2. The player at node j has a particular type of information or other good 7 of value v ij for player i.
3. If v = (v ij ) (i;j)2N N is the matrix of values, c = (c ij ) (i;j)2N N is the matrix of costs (it is assumed that c ii = v ii = 0), and g is the strategy pro…le and g the resulting network, the payo¤ of a player is given by a function
where
is the information received by i through the actual network g , and c i (g; c) = P j2N d (i;g) c ij the cost incurred by i. Under di¤erent assumptions, di¤erent models specify g and I i di¤erently. In all cases a game in strategic form is speci…ed:
We consider two basic models relating g to g:
(ii)
Under assumption (2) only links intended by both players actually form. This is Jackson and Wolinsky's model of network formation, where establishing a link requires that both players intend it. Under assumption (3) a directed link forms between two players as soon as one of them intends it. Thus, in this case a player can create oriented links unilaterally. This is Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow network formation model 8 . If every node receives the value of the players with whom it is connected in g without friction, then, according to each of these speci…cations of the resulting actual network, i.e., whether g is given by (2) or (3), the payo¤ of a player i given by (1) becomes respectively
In fact, the model speci…ed by (2) and (4) is Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay 9 , that is, assuming that the ‡ow through a link of the actual network is perfect or without loss. Similarly, (3) and (5) specify Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model without decay.
Between two models
In both Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) connections model and Bala and Goyal's (2000) one-way ‡ow models, a level of friction or decay in the ‡ow through a link can be 8 A third basic model is Bala and Goyal's (2000) two-way ‡ow model, where the actual network is g ij := g max ij = maxfg ij ; g ji g: 9 In fact, unlike Bala and Goyal (2000) , this case is not considered in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , where a certain decay is always assumed. assumed, so that only a fraction of the information at one node reaches the other through that link. In order to bridge the gap between these models, we assume that information ‡ows through a strong link without friction in both directions, while through a weak link information runs only towards the node that supports it but with a certain decay, being (0 1) the fraction of the unit of information at a node that ‡ows through it, thus = 0 means no ‡ow and maximal decay, while = 1 means perfect ‡ow and no decay. Formally, we assume that the actual ‡ow level of information from node j to node i through a link between them when players' strategy pro…le is g, denoted by g ij , is given by
for all i; j 2 N , with 2 [0; 1]. Note that the decay matrix g = g ij i;j2N encapsulates all the relevant information about the ‡ow through the network.
In this model, for 0 < < 1, when a link is supported by both players (g ij = g ji = 1)
e. information ‡ows through strong links without friction in both directions, while when one and only one player supports it, say i (i.e. g ij = 1 and g ji = 0), we have g ij = and g ji = 0, i.e. ‡ow through weak links occurs with some decay towards the only player supporting it and there is no ‡ow in the opposite direction. For = 0 we have Jackson and Wolinsky's bilateral network formation model without decay, while for = 1 we have Bala and Goyal's unilateral one-way ‡ow network formation model. Note this model's similarity to and di¤erence from Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model with decay. Weak links, i.e. links supported by only one player, work as in that model, while ‡ow through strong links, i.e. links supported by both players, is perfect. This important di¤erence enriches the setting with the possibility of di¤erent treatment of links with strong support 10 . This "intermediate" model describes a "mixed" situation where both a strictly non-cooperative approach as well as one admitting bilateral agreements to form new strong links, make sense. In this transitional model we …rst examine the question of stability from two points of view: one strictly non-cooperative, focused on Nash and strict Nash equilibrium, and another allowing for pairwise formation of links. In the current setting the set of options available to any player is richer than in Jackson and 10 Moreover, if an additional level of decay is introduced in the model, we have a new one, whose decay matrix is
that is, when a link is supported by both players the ‡ow through it is the same in both directions ( 0g ij = 0g ji = ), while when only one player supports it (g ij = 1 and g ji = 0) the information ‡ows only towards the player that supports it and with a greater decay ( 0g ij = 0g ji = ). That is, with and without decay, doubly supported links are treated di¤erently, which may be a reasonable assumption in certain contexts. Again, when = 1 this is Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model with decay, while when = 0 this is Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model with decay.
Wolinsky's setting where the only unilateral movement is severing a link, which is the only one considered in their de…nition of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) 11 . In our model a player can also create a new weak link or double an existing weak one to make it strong. This leads us to use in this context a strong version of the pairwise stability notion referred to in the literature as pairwise Nash stability 12 . Thus we consider the following three forms of stability.
De…nition 2
Note that pairwise Nash stability re…nes both Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability.
Now the point is to study the stable networks in this model for the di¤erent values of the parameter (0 1) assuming homogeneity in costs and values across players, that is, we assume throughout the paper v ij = 1 and c ij = c, where 0 < c < 1 13 and i 6 = j;
so that, for all values of the parameters, the cost for a player i in a pro…le g is given by
Let us …rst consider the extreme cases = 0 and = 1. When = 0 we have Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay: a link is formed if and only if both players intend it, and in this case the ‡ow through it is perfect in both directions. Thus (4) becomes.
Proposition 1 If the decay matrix g is given by (6) with = 0 and payo¤s by (7) : (i) The Nash and strict Nash pro…les are those where all links are strong and all strong components are minimal.
(ii) The pairwise Nash stable pro…les are those minimally strongly connected.
Thus, in equilibrium, for any two players either there is no path that connects them or there is a unique path formed by strong links, but note that a Nash network can be non-connected, given that in a noncooperative context when = 0 a single player cannot form an actual link. (For a proof of Proposition 1 see Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b)). When = 1 we have Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model without decay, where a link can be unilaterally formed by any player, and (5) becomes
As to noncooperative stability, we have Bala and Goyal's well-known result.
Proposition 2 (Bala and Goyal, 2000) If the decay matrix g is given by (6) with = 1 and payo¤s by (8) : (i) The Nash pro…les are those minimally connected.
(ii) The strict Nash pro…les are oriented wheels.
In this model, in a Nash pro…le all players receive all the information in the network without decay, then pairwise Nash stability does not re…ne Nash equilibrium because bilateral agreements add nothing in this context.
We consider now the intermediate situations (0 < < 1) between these two extreme cases and see how the transition occurs. The payo¤ function is (using the discounting distance introduced in Section 2) then
Example 2: Consider the strategy pro…le given by the 6-node graph in Example 1.
Player 1 receives information only from players 2 and 3, a fraction of the unit of information at each of these nodes, and pays one link. Thus player 1's payo¤ is 1 (g) = 2 c. Player 2's payo¤ is 2 (g) = 1 c, given that 2 receives information only from player 3, but perfectly, and pays one link. Player 4's payo¤ is 4 (g) = 3 + 2 2c, given that receives from players 2, 3, and 5, and 2 from player 6; and pays two links. Similarly, 3 (g) = 1 c; 5 (g) = c; and 6 (g) = 0: We deal then with a model with two parameters, and c, both ranging from 0 to 1. In the sequel we study stability for di¤erent con…gurations of values ( ; c) of these parameters within the open square (0; 1) (0; 1) (see Figure 1 ).
Stability
The following lemma allows for a full-characterization of stable architectures below the line c = 1 (i.e. for c < 1 ), and a partial characterization above this line.
Lemma 1 If the decay matrix
g is given by (6) and payo¤s by (9), with 0 < < 1, in a Nash pro…le:
; only strong links occur.
; any link which is not part of a cycle is necessarily strong. In particular, peripheral players are connected by strong links.
Proof. (i) Let g be a Nash pro…le. Assume g ij = 1 and g ji = 0. Then there is no path of strong links connecting i and j, otherwise link ij would be super ‡uous. This entails that j receives from i's unit of worth no more than , while by doubling its weak link with i node j would receive 1 c. As c < 1 , j would increase its payo¤ by doing so.
(ii) Let g be a Nash pro…le and i and j two players connected by a weak link which is not part of any cycle. Assume g ij = 1 and g ji = 0, then j does not receive information from i, and as c < 1, j (g + ji)
j (g) 1 c > 0, i.e. j improves its payo¤ by doubling the link.
The next proposition characterizes the stable architectures within the region below the line c = 1 :
Proposition 3 If the decay matrix g is given by (6) and payo¤s by (9), with 0 < < 1 and 0 < c < 1
; then:
; a pro…le is Nash (strict Nash) stable if and only if either it is minimally strongly connected, or, otherwise, all links are strong, all strong components are minimal and the maximal size of a strong component is smaller or equal (strictly smaller) than c= .
(ii) If c < ; a pro…le is Nash stable if and only if it is minimally strongly connected, moreover such pro…le is also strict Nash stable. (iii) For the whole range of values, a pro…le is pairwise Nash stable if and only if it is minimally strongly connected.
Proof. (i) Assume g is a Nash pro…le. By Lemma 1-(i), within this range of values of and c all links are strong, and no super ‡uous link would be supported. Therefore all strong components are minimal. If g is minimally strongly connected no player has an incentive to intend or sever a link. Otherwise, let s (integer s.t. 1 s < n) be the size of a strong component of g, and i a node that does not belong to this component. By paying a weak link with any node in that component i would receive s c, and if s c > 0, i.e., if s > c= , this would mean a strict improvement of i's payo¤. Therefore, for g to be a Nash pro…le no strong component of g may have a size greater than c= . Reciprocally, if these conditions hold no node has a best response that improves its payo¤. As to strict Nash stability, this condition must hold strictly.
(ii) If c < , as in (i) it is easy to conclude that in a Nash pro…le all links are strong and all strong components are minimal. But now, as c < , it is strictly pro…table to initiate a weak link with an isolated player. Therefore, a Nash pro…le must have a single strong component which must be minimal. Reciprocally, in any minimally strongly connected pro…le no node has a best response that improves its payo¤. Moreover, all minimally strongly connected pro…les are strict Nash as any unilateral change of strategy would cause a loss.
(iii) Once bilateral agreements are feasible, a non strongly connected pro…le cannot be pairwise Nash stable since for any two players in di¤erent strong components of a Nash network it would be pro…table to form a strong link. Thus, whatever the values of c and within the range considered, only minimally strongly connected pro…les remain pairwise Nash stable.
Then Proposition 3 characterizes the Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stable architectures within the region c < 1
: Now we show that the same structures remain stable above the line c = 1 , but they are not the only ones that are stable above this line.
Proposition 4 If the decay matrix
g is given by (6) and payo¤s by (9), with 0 < < 1 and c 1 ; then (i), (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 3 remain true if it is assumed that the pro…le contains no cycles.
Proof. Assume g is a Nash pro…le with no cycles. By Lemma 1-(ii), within this range of values of and c all links are strong, and no super ‡uous link would be supported. Therefore all strong components are minimal. Then the proof of (i),(ii) and (iii) follows the same steps as in Proposition 3. (i) Figure 1 illustrates the situation described by Propositions 3 and 4. The lefthand side of the rectangle, i.e. = 0, represents Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay, where Nash and strict Nash pro…les are those where all links are strong and all strong components are minimal, and pairwise Nash stable those minimally strongly connected. In region S all minimally strongly connected pro…les as well as those pro…les described in Proposition 3-(i) and Proposition 4-(i) where the size of the greatest strong component is smaller or equal (strictly smaller) than s are Nash (strict Nash) stable. Moreover, below the straight line c = 1 these are the only Nash (strict Nash) structures, while above this line they are the only Nash (strict Nash) structures without cycles. As one moves right from the side = 0, all the structures characterized in Proposition 1-(i) as Nash and strict Nash when = 0 remain strict Nash as far as n 1 < c= , while at n 1 = c= the only isolated individual in a pro…le where the rest of the players form a minimal strong component is indi¤erent to pay a weak link with any other individual, but when n 1 > c= this player has an incentive to do it. In this way, as c= decreases, smaller maximal sizes of a strong component are enough to make it pro…table for any player that does not belong to that component to pay a weak link with any player belonging to it. When c= > 1, but this value is very close to 1, apart from minimally strongly connected pro…les, only the empty network, where all strong components are singletons, remains strict Nash among such pro…les. Beyond this point, i.e., when c < and c < 1 , the only Nash and strict Nash stable pro…les are those minimally strongly connected, the same is true when c 1 if attention is con…ned to pro…les with no cycles. (ii) As to pairwise Nash stable pro…les, only minimally strongly connected pro…les are such below the line c = 1 ; and the same is true above this line for strategy pro…les without cycles. But in view of Proposition 3-(ii) and Proposition 4-(ii), within the range of values considered, below the line c = pairwise Nash stability adds nothing to (i.e. does not re…ne) Nash stability, given that in this case bilateral coordination is irrelevant because it does not really o¤er new chances to the players. , in equilibrium all links are strong unless there are cycles. Nevertheless, unlike when c < 1
, when c 1 weak links may actually occur in equilibrium if there are cycles. The following discussion shows that the stability of oriented wheels (i.e. the only strict Nash architecture for the Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model without decay) is con…ned to a region close to = 1, i.e. to Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model. Consider the n-player pro…le consisting of n weak links which form an oriented wheel. No node has an incentive to sever the only link it is supporting out of the two it is involved in and double the other one if
Condition (10) sets a lower bound for : In particular implies that no node is interested in severing the only link it supports, that is
No player has an incentive to double a weak link if
Therefore, (10) and (11) are necessary conditions for an n-player oriented wheel to be stable. Note that the greater the number of players, the less constraining the …rst condition is and the more constraining the latter. In general, these conditions are not su¢ cient. For instance, assume n is odd, i.e. n = 2m + 1 for some integer m, N = fi 0 ; i 1 ; :::; i 2m g and g i 1 i 0 = g i 2 i 1 = ::: = g i 2m i 2m 1 = g i 0 i 2m = 1. Then i 0 has no incentive to initiate a link with i m if
When the number of players increases, these conditions constrain considerably the region where an oriented wheel can be stable. Figure 2 illustrates this for n = 11. Condition (10) sets an lower bound on , and its boundary is represented by a vertical dashed line, while the other two, (11) and (12), set lower bounds for c relative to . Therefore, these necessary conditions constrain the possible stability of oriented wheels to two regions (their boundaries in thick lines in the …gure): a narrow strip close to = 1 (i.e. to Bala and Goyal's one-way ‡ow model), along with a small piece between (10) and (12) (there is always room between) and above (11), which as n increases shrinks to a small patch close to ( ; c) = ( As to condition (12), no player has an incentive to initiate a new link with the node at the opposite corner of the square if:
, that is, if
But this is implied by c 1 3 . In fact, it can easily be checked that if conditions (10) and (11) hold no change of strategy by a single node improves its payo¤. Thus, these conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for the 4-node oriented wheel to be a Nash network (strict Nash if both conditions hold strictly). Pairwise Nash stability further requires that not two nodes between which no link exists bene…t from creating a strong one, that is Figure 3 shows the region where conditions (10) and (11) hold and the 4-node oriented wheel is Nash (strict Nash in the interior): to the right of line (10) and above curve (11). Finally, the 4-node oriented wheel is pairwise Nash stable above curve (13), dashed in the …gure.
E¢ ciency
We now address the question of e¢ ciency. A pro…le is e¢ cient if it maximizes the aggregate payo¤ for a particular con…guration of values of the parameters. The following result shows that e¢ cient pro…les must be connected.
Proof. Assume g is an e¢ cient pro…le where i and j are in di¤erent components. Therefore the contribution of i's (j's) unit of value to j's (i's) payo¤ is 0. If a strong link between i and j forms the unit of information at each one would reach the other perfectly at a joint cost of 2c, therefore, as c < 1; the sum of the payo¤s of i and j would increase, and no other player's payo¤ would decrease. Thus g cannot have more than one component.
The following proposition provides a partial characterization of e¢ cient pro…les.
Proposition 5
If the decay matrix g is given by (6) and payo¤s by (9), with 0 < < 1 and 0 < c < 2 (1 ) ; the e¢ cient pro…les are those minimally strongly connected.
Proof. Assume g is an e¢ cient pro…le. Assume g ij = 1 and g ji = 0. Then there is no path of strong links connecting i and j, otherwise link ij would be super ‡uous. This entails that i receives from j's unit of worth a fraction , and j receives from i's unit of worth no more than . By doubling the weak link ij, each i and j would receive the unit of worth at the other node perfectly, at an added cost of c. Then if c < 2(1 ) doubling a weak link will increase the sum of the payo¤s of i and j, and no other player's payo¤ would decrease, thus in e¢ cient pro…les only strong links form. Moreover, e¢ ciency rules out cycles in a pro…le where all links are strong. This together with Lemma 2 ensures that g is minimally strongly connected. Therefore for c < 2(1 ) the e¢ cient pro…les, i.e. minimally strongly connected pro…les, are also stable (Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash). Moreover for c < 1 the e¢ cient pro…les are the only ones that are stable.
As for c 2(1 ) Example 3 shows that other pro…les, as oriented wheels, can be stable. Moreover, they can also be more e¢ cient than minimally strongly connected pro…les. This occurs for an n-node oriented wheel if:
For instance, for n = 4 this becomes c > 6 2 2 2 2 3 , which holds in a narrow region close to = 1: As approaches 1 weak links become more e¢ cient and therefore more abundant in e¢ cient pro…les. Moreover, at the limit e¢ cient networks are oriented wheels of weak links.
Dynamics
Bala and Goyal (2000) provide a dynamic model that converges to strict Nash networks for the one-way ‡ow model without decay. They consider sequential best response dynamics: at every period a player chosen at random plays a best response while all other players keep their links unchanged. This de…nes a Markov chain on the state space of all networks and they prove that this dynamic model converges to the oriented wheel for the one-way ‡ow model. We now address the extension of this dynamic model to the current setting.
As a full characterization of strict Nash pro…les has been achieved only for c < 1 , we only address the question of convergence of dynamics for values of the parameters within this region. We have the following: Proposition 6 If the decay matrix g is given by (6) and payo¤s by (9), with 0 < < 1 and c < 1
, then sequential best response dynamics converge to a strict Nash network with probability 1.
As this result (and its proof) is entirely similar to Proposition 12 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b), we omit a repetition of all the details. In order to make the paper basically self-contained we give an informal description of the way of producing a sequence of best responses starting from any strategy pro…le that yields a strict Nash pro…le. The idea is the following:
1. After a best response from an arbitrary node i: (i) the set of nodes in the strong component of the resulting pro…le containing i contains the set of nodes in the strong component containing i in the previous pro…le; (ii) no further best response will ever break a strong link in which i is involved; (iii) any weak link supported by i belongs to a di¤erent strong component (similar to Lemma 7 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b)).
2. Therefore, if after an arbitrary player plays a best response another player in the same (new) strong component plays another, after a …nite number of steps all players in a strong component must be playing best responses. Then either the component is isolated or one of its nodes is supporting a weak link with a node j in a di¤erent strong component. In the latter case, let j play a best response and restart the sequence. In this way after a …nite number of best responses an isolated strong component C is generated. (see Procedure 1 and Claim 1, in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b)).
3. At the end of the sequence described in 2, there are two possible cases: either #C c= or not. In the latter case, apply the sequence described in 2 starting with a node in a di¤erent strong component. Reiterate the process until a component of size c= is generated or, otherwise, a pro…le consisting of isolated strong components of size smaller than c= is generated. In the second case, a strict Nash pro…le is obtained (Algorithm 1, Claim 2 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b)). Otherwise proceed as follows.
4. If at the end of 3 a strong component of size greater or equal than c= is obtained, then it is easy to show that a sequence of best responses exists that yields a pro…le consisting of a unique minimally strongly connected component, i.e. a minimally strongly connected pro…le, strict Nash in the whole region (Lemma 8 in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b)).
In Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b) a modi…cation of the sequential best response dynamics consistent with a scenario where pairwise link formation is allowed is proposed. Namely, in every period a player may either play a best response or propose the formation of a new strong link to one player. This "extended" best response dynamics ensures convergence to a pairwise Nash stable pro…le by just letting players keep playing once a strict Nash pro…le is reached till the resulting pro…le is strongly connected.
Concluding remarks
Proposition 3 fully characterizes Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stable architectures for the whole range of values of the parameters within the region c < 1
: As to the region where c 1 , Proposition 4 does not provide a full characterization. Cycles are possible, but a characterization of stable architectures with cycles seems very complicated.
In sum, the transition from Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) connections model without decay (case = 0 in our model) to Bala and Goyal's (2000) one-way ‡ow model (case = 1 in our model) has certain similarities with the transition to Bala and Goyal's (2000) two-way ‡ow model studied in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b) , and certain di¤erences.
In the model considered here, below the line c < 1 everything occurs as it does in the model in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b) below the line c < 1 14 . In both cases, in this region we have a smooth extension of the results in Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model. The stability of the pro…les for Jackson and Wolinsky's connections model without decay (Proposition 1) extends for each of them up to a point: the moment when the greatest strong component is enough to make the pro…le unstable. In both models, beyond the point where c = in the current model, the only Nash, strict Nash and pairwise Nash stable pro…les are those minimally strongly connected. As to e¢ ciency, Proposition 7 characterizes e¢ cient pro…les for c < 2 (1 ) ; which for c < 1 are also pairwise Nash stable. The dynamics models discussed in Section 7 prove convergence to strict Nash and to pairwise Nash stable pro…les.
On the contrary, above the line c = 1 results di¤er with those above the line c = 1 in the model in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b) . In both models, only stable architectures without cycles have been characterized. In the model considered here the line c = 1 has no impact on stability (Proposition 4), while in the other model above the line c = 1 peripheral players must be necessarily connected through weak links in equilibrium, giving rise to the tree-core-periphery architectures. In the model in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014b) the existence of cycles above this line was unsettled, while here their existence has been established (Example 3 and preceding discussion).
A comparison with the transition from Bala and Goyal's (2000) one-way ‡ow model to their two-way ‡ow model studied in Olaizola and Valenciano (2014a) is pertinent here. In that case the oriented wheel remained as the only stable structure for most of the region of values of the parameters. New stable structures (…rst the center-sponsored star, then other root-oriented trees and wheels of trees) only appeared for values of (the fraction of the unit of information at one player which ‡ows in the direction towards a player not supporting a weak link) close to 1 (i.e. very close to the two-way ‡ow model), the oriented wheel ceasing to be stable when the last root-oriented tree, the oriented line, becomes stable. Here instead the stability of the oriented wheel is con…ned to a region close to = 1, i.e. the one-way ‡ow model.
